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“The reluctance to talk about divorce on the wedding 
day” 1 is a factor often cited by the doctrine to explain 
the absence of withdrawal clauses in EEC and EU 
treaties before Lisbon. Nonetheless, roughly 15 years 
in existence, Europe’s monetary union has been 
facing the openly discussed prospect of a break-up at 
least since the global financial crisis triggered by the 
Lehman Brothers failure in 2007. The crisis has since 
spread to European banks, and ultimately brought 
out the excessive levels of public debt in a number 
of European countries – as Warren Buffet famously 
observed: “You only find who has been swimming 
naked when the tide goes out”. Trimming public debt 
back to a sustainable level can be achieved either by 
direct debt reduction or by redenomination of debt 
into a new, devaluated currency. While the former can 
be attained by various means, in particular austerity 
measures, debt restructuring or inflation, the latter 
implies an exit from the Eurozone for the concerned 
EU Member States. In this respect, the “Exit Clause” 
inserted in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 may well turn 
out to be a game changer. The purpose of this paper 
is to assess whether the legal framework currently in 
force in the EU permits a break-up of the Eurozone, 
with a particular emphasis on recent developments in 
the financial markets.
What is commonly referred to as the Eurozone is in 
fact an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of EU 
1 WeileR Joseph h. h., Alternatives to withdrawal from an international 
organization: the case of the European Economic Community, 
Isr. L. Rev. 20, 1985, 282–298, p. 282.
Does the EU’s current legal framework permit a 
break-up of the Eurozone? The author discusses 
the inapplicability of Article 56 Vienna Convention 
and the reasons why the newly introduced Art. 
50 TEU does not apply when only the European 
Monetary Union is concerned. He then criticizes 
this legal solution, by referring to the financial 
situation and the need for options.
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Member States using the Euro as sole legal tender2, 
established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. As 
such, the Eurozone rests on an international treaty, 
suggesting from the outset that international public 
law is applicable to investigate rights and obligations 
deriving from it, in particular the right of unilateral 
withdrawal.
Before the Lisbon Treaty, both the EEC and the EU 
treaties contained no provisions that dealt directly 
with their termination. Whereas it is widely accepted 
that a consensual withdrawal from an international 
organisation is in principle always possible, it is 
usually assumed that the Vienna Convention3, 
specifically Article  56, does not permit expulsion 
or unilateral withdrawal4. However, in a landmark 
ruling, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated 
that “the Community constitutes a new legal order 
of international law”5. This position has led the 
majority of authors to support the view that the 
European treaties resemble a constitution that entails 
a permanent limitation of Member State sovereignty6, 
and that the Vienna Convention is not applicable for 
EU-internal affairs. This view has been supported to 
date7, and the existence of a right of withdrawal from 
the Eurozone will henceforth be investigated under 
EU law solely.
The Lisbon Treaty saw the introduction of 
Article  50  TEU, commonly dubbed “Exit Clause”. 
This provision allows EU Member States to file a 
notice of withdrawal that will be effective at most 
two years later, unless an exit agreement between the 
2 Art. 3 (4) of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), OJ C–326, 26.10.2012.
3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23.05.1969 (SR 0.111).
4 aKehuRst miChael, Withdrawal from International Organizations, 
Current Legal Problems, 32 (1), 1979, 143–154, p. 151.
5 ECJ, Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, 
1963, ECR 1 ; position confirmed in ECJ, Case 6/64 Costa v Enel, 
1964, ECR 585.
6 hill John a., The European Economic Community: the Right of 
Member State Withdrawal, Ga. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 12, 1982, 335–357, 
p. 339 ; WeileR, op. cit, p. 286.
7 athanassiou phoebus, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and 
EMU: Some reflections, ECB, Legal Working Paper Series, 10, 2009, 
p. 18.
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exiting Member State and the EU is reached earlier. 
While Article  50  TEU addresses the exit of the EU 
as a whole, the Lisbon Treaty remains silent as to an 
exit from the Eurozone specifically. First, does the 
Exit Clause comprise a unilateral right of withdrawal 
from EMU? Second, can the Exit Clause be selectively 
applied on subsets of the EU, such as EMU?
Regarding the first question, although an author 
argues that “nothing short of the express […] 
requirement for a negotiated withdrawal from EMU”8 
would be acceptable, even for a Member State that 
has previously left the EU on the basis of the Exit 
Clause, it cannot seriously be doubted that, reasoning 
e maiore minus, a right of unilateral withdrawal from 
the EU encompasses the same right for subsets of the 
EU, such as EMU. The converse, namely whether an 
exit from the Eurozone necessarily entails forfeiting 
EU membership altogether, is a dodgier issue. Two 
important features of the three–stage process lasting 
from 1992 to 1999 to establish the Eurozone were: (i) 
the legal obligation for EU Member States to adopt 
the Euro as soon as they satisfied the convergence 
criteria9 and (ii) the irrevocable and irreversible 
character of EMU’s integration process10. However, 
the legal obligation for Member States to adhere to 
EMU has not yet fully materialised as opt–outs were 
negotiated by the United Kingdom and Denmark11. 
Besides, hardly consistent with the spirit of the law is 
Sweden’s decline to meet the convergence criteria in 
order to remain out of EMU12. Nevertheless, leaving 
the Eurozone is a wholly different affair than delaying 
accession, and there arguably exists no right to remain 
in the EU in the former case to this day.
This state of (legal) affairs may, though, not be 
in line anymore with the EU’s best interest in 
view of the recent developments in the financial 
markets. Already back in 2005, an author pointed to 
speculative attacks against the Euro by referring to 
investment strategies proposed by investment banks 
8  athanassiou, op. cit., p. 29.
9  Art. 109j of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C–224, 31.08.1992.
10 Treaty on European Union, Protocol on the transition to the third 
stage of Economic and Monetary Union, OJ C–224/123, 31.08.1992.
11 Treaty on European Union, Protocols on certain provisions relating 
to : the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ; and 
Denmark, OJ C–224/123 ssq., 31.08.1992.
12 sCott hal s., When the Euro falls apart – A Sequel, Harvard Law 
School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 12 (16), 
2012, p. 7.
based on the expectation of a Eurozone break-up13. 
Indeed, financial markets in general have been quite 
unimpressed by assurances that the possibility of a 
Eurozone break-up was “a very remote prospect”14, 
and have, in fact, bet on such a scenario. First, trading 
strategies have exploited so–called redenomination 
risk. They anticipate that bonds issued under the 
legislation of a Member State thought to leave EMU 
will be redenominated in the new local devaluated 
currency, while bonds of the same issuer under 
other legislations will be reimbursed in Euros15. As 
a result, investors holding locally issued bonds of a 
presumptively leaving Member State will earn an 
additional risk premium on their investment. And 
indeed, redenomination risk was shown to explain 
the unusually high yield spreads seen on the bond 
markets among different EMU Member States since 
201116. Second, and as a consequence of high yield 
spreads, Member States may be tempted to bring some 
relief to their budgetary woes by paying off their bills 
directly with new bond issues. Effectively introducing 
a new currency would then be just one step away, 
that is, accepting these bonds as a means of payment. 
Some commentators considered that Greece’s so–
called “pharma bonds” came, in fact, dangerously 
close to introducing “quasi-drachmas”17. Third, 
the turmoil on the European bond market brought 
Cyprus’ financial system to the brink of collapse in 
March 2013. Emergency capital controls were put in 
place in order to avoid massive capital flight. These 
capital controls had not yet been fully lifted at the 
end of January 2014, raising questions about the 
compatibility of the measure with EU guarantees for 
the free flow of capital18.
In view of these developments, we adhere to the view 
that “insisting on the impossibility of withdrawal 
might be counterproductive, especially in an 
13 smits René, The European Constitution and EMU: An Appraisal, 
Common Market Law Review, 42, 2005, 425–468, p. 465.
14 pRoCtoR ChaRles, The Future of the Euro – What happens if a 
Member State Leaves ?, European Business Law Review, 17 (4), 2006, 
909–937, p. 924.
15 The Wall Street Journal, For Euro Investors, Time to Check the Fine 
Print, 21.11.2011.
16 di CesaRe antonio et al, Recent estimates of Sovereign Risk 
Premia for Euro–Area Countries, The Sovereign Debt Crisis and the 
Euro Area, Banca d’Italia, 2013, 13–52.
17 The Financial Times, Greek Funny Money, 08.02.2012.
18 While Art. 66 TEU may offer the basis for exceptions to the free 
flow of capital regulated in Art. 63 TEU, the ECJ has tended to interpret 
such exceptions restrictively.
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organisation like the EU” 19. Pushing that argument 
further, an author suggested that resisting withdrawal 
from EMU may “ultimately wreck the EU itself ” and 
that a way out of the crisis was to “relieve the pressure 
by allowing withdrawals [from EMU] and put those 
withdrawing in the purgatory of [an exchange-rate 
mechanism] from which they can return some day to 
euro membership”20. This solution, though, requires 
19 heRbst JoChen, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the 
European Union: Who are the « Masters of the Treaties » ?, German 
Law Journal, 6 (11), 2005, 1756–1760, p. 1760.
20 sCott, op. cit., p. 3.
setting up a legal framework for an EMU exit while 
preserving EU membership. Such a “legal forward 
guidance” may not only contribute to an orderly 
Eurozone exit, but may also lessen the volatility in 
the financial markets by offering a clear roadmap 
to market participants and thereby reducing the 
opportunities for speculation.
Quid? 1/2014de Weck
15
